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Law as Communitarian Virtue Ethics
SHERMAN J. CLARKt
INTRODUCTION
This essay outlines a way of thinking about law
analogous to the approach taken by virtue ethics to moral
and ethical theory. I do not mean that virtue ethics per se
should be applied as a tool within the law-an endeavor
that I think is destined for mixed success. Rather, I suggest
that the governance and regulation of a community can and
should be thought about in ways akin to the ways in which
virtue ethics looks at the governance and regulation of an
individual life. Such an approach would seek out a third,
interconnected way, alongside the dominant paradigms of
utilitarian cost/benefit analysis (including law and
economics) and deontological or normative analysis (includ-
ing rights-based approaches).
Virtue ethics in moral theory rejects the Kantian
emphasis on first principles, as well as the utilitarian focus
on preference satisfaction. Instead, it recalls an older
tradition which suggests that what makes for a good and
fulfilling individual life is not so much getting what you
want, or even living according to certain right rules.
Instead, what conduces to happiness-what happiness
perhaps even consists in-is being the right kind of person.
What matters is character. Communitarian virtue ethics
("CVE") would call for a similar approach to community life.
In addition to asking what a particular rule or practice will
accomplish, and whether it is right or wrong, communi-
tarian virtue ethics would ask a third sort of question.
What kind of people will it help us to become?
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
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The term "virtue" in this context, as will perhaps be
evident, does not refer merely to general "goodness." It
refers instead to particular character traits thought to be
worthy of respect or emulation. Indeed, virtue ethics might
more accurately be termed "admirable character trait
ethics" or something along those lines. The virtues, on this
account, are more specific traits like courage, generosity,
wisdom, or temperance. Often, they are much more specific
traits: the toughness and courage in battle valued by the
Spartans, the charity and selflessness emblematic of
Mother Theresa, the patient and articulate wisdom of
Lincoln, or the even-handed detachment one might look for
in the ideal judge. The virtues are particular ways of being
to which we aspire, about which we dispute, and through
which we define ourselves. Applied to an individual life,
virtue ethics calls upon us each to ask ourselves a series of
questions: Which traits do you find admirable? Which do
you want to find or construct in yourself? Which ways of
being will allow you to lead a kind of life that you desire
and will find both satisfying and worthy of respect? And,
finally, what will it take to build or locate those traits in
yourself-to make yourself the kind of person you can
admire? CVE would encourage the law to provide a forum
for us to ask the same sorts of questions of ourselves as a
community.
An alternative way to state the thesis is to say that law,
understood not primarily as a body of rules but rather as an
ongoing conversation, can serve as a valuable and perhaps
irreplaceable arena for the construction and articulation of
community identity. One of the functions performed by law,
and which might be performed more effectively and benefi-
cially, is to provide a context and an arena for an ongoing
conversation about what sort of a community we are and
want to be.
This is a potentially useful and sensible way to think
about law for at least four reasons. First, it has explanatory
value. Many high profile and contentious areas of law and
politics make more sense once it is recognized that debates
within them often serve as proxies for competing visions of
public character and community identity. Second, CVE
sheds light on the moral and ethical theory out of which it
grows. In particular, applying the insights of virtue ethics
to the community provides a way of thinking about the
source and origin of the virtues to which people aspire.
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Third, and closely connected, CVE is worth pursuing
because it provides a way of thinking about a problem of
long-standing and enduring theoretical interest. What is
the relationship between character in an individual and
character in (or the character of) a political community?
That problem is at the heart of Plato's Republic, and
Aristotle's Politics, and ought to be, though so far has not
been, at the center of thinking about both virtue ethics and
law. The fourth and in my view most important justification
for the approach outlined in this essay is that it addresses
directly the thing which law and politics arguably ought to
care about most, but which is largely ignored by the great
bulk of contemporary scholarship-human happiness.
In this final sense, CVE might be seen as an alternative
to law and economics. Where law and economics begins
with the often unspoken and essentially undefended
assumption that human happiness will be advanced
through the satisfaction of preferences and/or marginal
increases in objective or material well-being, variously
defined and measured, CVE proceeds from an alternative
assumption, drawn from the Platonic and Aristotelean
tradition, that happiness emerges instead from certain
ways of being.
My goal here is to sketch out what it might mean to
look at law from this perspective, and to defend my claim
that it is a good idea to do so. To those ends, I first describe
briefly the theory of virtue ethics, then move quickly to
what communitarian virtue ethics might look like. I then
attempt to answer a series of questions about the theory as
well as respond to potential objections to it. What would
CVE arguments look or sound like if made in a court or a
legislature? Why should lawyers learn to make, and legal
processes be open to, these sorts of arguments? Would these
be legitimate and valid "legal" arguments, entitled to
weight in legal decision-making? What role can or should
law play in the construction or articulation of community
character? What are the implications of CVE for legal schol-
arship? Finally, I acknowledge that I have not even tried to
answer, but have merely posed and asked that law be
willing to address, the deeper and ultimate question raised
by the theory. Given that character-rather than preference
satisfaction, for example-is what we ought to pursue, what
sort of character should we strive to articulate and
construct?
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II
What is virtue ethics? It is a way of thinking about how
we ought to live our lives. It differs from alternative
approaches to ethics and morality not only in its methods,
but more fundamentally in its goals and operating
assumptions. Unlike deontological or consequentialist
approaches, both of which emphasize ideas of duty and
obligation-though specified in different and sometimes
conflicting ways-virtue ethics focuses on human thriving.
The aim is neither to describe or categorize various actions
as right or wrong, nor to provide a set of rules against
which actions can be so described or evaluated. Rather, the
goal of virtue ethics is to identify ways of being which will
conduce to or even constitute human excellence and happi-
ness. The focus is on character, rather than primarily on
conduct, although, critically, character is understood to be
both revealed by and constituted through action. Virtue
ethics asks us to think carefully about not just what we
accomplish, and not just whether our actions are right or
wrong, but more essentially on what sort of people we are,
and on what that can mean for the quality of our lives.
This way of thinking has its origins in the work of the
ancient Greeks-particularly Plato, Aristotle, and the
Stoics.1 Their approach to ethics, however, was so different
from the currently regnant modes of ethical theorizing-
orthogonal, really-that they can be difficult to read and
appreciate now. It is hard to pin down the ancients on the
questions that to us seem essential to ethics. What, exactly,
is Plato's view on the nature and source of moral duty? In
Aristotle's view, are the virtues he elucidates merely
conventional-the traits of a good and successful Athenian
1. The essential sources for classical virtue ethics are the dialogues of Plato
(primarily the Republic, but also the Charmides (on temperance), the Crito (on
justice), the Laches (on courage), the Euthyphro (on piety and justice), the
Protagoras (on virtue and how it is acquired), the Phaedo (describing the
execution of Socrates), and the Apology); and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
(along with, to a lesser extent, his Politics, Eudemian Ethics, and Rhetoric). See,
e.g., PLATO, THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO (Edith Hamilton &
Huntington Cairns eds., 1961); ARISTOTLE, THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
(Richard McKeon ed., 1941). An excellent brief introduction to classical virtue
ethics and its sources is provided in RAYMOND J. DEVERETTE, INTRODUCTION TO
VIRTUE ETHICS (2002).
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gentleman? Or are they somehow transcendent obligations?
Our inability to find clear answers to these questions can
give rise to a sense that the work of the ancients is
somehow obscure and difficult, or perhaps irrelevant to
sophisticated modern thinking. It is none of those things.
They were simply asking different questions-questions
that we can and I think do care about as well. When they
wrote about ethics, they were not focusing on the sorts of
questions we are tempted to foist on them. They were not
asking what sorts of actions are obligatory or prohibited by
some transcendent moral law. Instead, they were talking
about what makes for a full and satisfying and excellent
human life.
A modern revival of virtue ethics was kicked off by
Elizabeth Anscombe with her 1958 article, Modern Moral
Philosophy,2 in which she criticized the regnant focus on
deontologically-derived obligation and suggested instead
that moral theory focus on ideas of virtue and human
flourishing, as did classical ethical theory.3 This suggestion
has been taken up or responded to in various ways by a
wide range of scholars, employing a wide range of
approaches. The leading figures have perhaps been Bernard
Williams, 4  Phillipa Foote, 5  Michael Slote,6  Alasdair
MacIntyre, 7 John McDowell,8 and Rosalind Hursthouse, 9
among others. With few exceptions, this work has not
focused on the role of community in the construction of
character,10 let alone on the connection between character
2. See G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 PHILOSOPHY 1 (1958).
3. See generally id.
4. See, e.g., BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY
(1985).
5. See, e.g., PHILLIPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY (1978).
6. See, e.g., Michael Slote, Agent-Based Virtue Ethics, in 20 MIDWEST
STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY (Peter A. French et al. eds., 1996).
7. See, e.g., ALISDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed., 1985).
8. See, e.g., John McDowell, Virtue and Reason, 62 MONIST 331 (1979).
9. See, e.g., Rosalind Hursthouse, ON VIRTUE ETHICS (1999).
10. A significant exception is Lawrence Blum, Community and Virtue, in
How SHOULD ONE LIVE? ESSAYS ON THE VIRTUES (Roger Crisp ed., 231 1996) (not
discussing law or politics, but arguing that community, variously understood,
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and law. 1 This body of work is too diverse to summarize,
but a common thread-a particular emphasis-is evident
throughout the literature. The emphasis is less on duty and
obligation than on excellence and flourishing-less on what
we should do to be "right" than on how we should be to be
happy.12
Virtue ethics, however, need not, and indeed should
not, be understood as essentially a branch of academic
moral philosophy, or as something arcane or inherently
technical. It is better understood as simply a reflection of
one of the ways in which thoughtful people go about our
lives, by thinking and talking about what kind of people we
want to be. We look to and emulate people we admire, and
strive to find and or create in ourselves the things we
admire in them-things like kindness, courage, temper-
ance, wisdom or any number of more specific and
contingent traits we find estimable. At the same time, we
look to some with pity, contempt, even disgust, and strive
not to see in ourselves the traits which produce those
reactions-traits such as cruelty, cowardice, gluttony, or
ignorance. This conversation does not take the form,
generally, of the refined parsing of virtues and their mean-
ings. It is instead the daily stuff of human interaction-
inherent in the stories we tell at the barber shop, the heroes
we cheer in motion pictures and on sports fields, the gossip
we whisper at the water cooler or over the back fence. That
is virtue ethics.
can not only teach and sustain virtues, but can also provide the specific content
of virtues and confer value on them.)
11. As a result, it has been suggested that there is a missing communitarian
aspect to virtue ethics. See, e.g., VIRTUE ETHICS: A CRITICAL READER, (Daniel
Statman ed., 1997) ("If [virtue ethics] and communitarianism stem form the
similar complaints about the basic assumptions of [deontological ethics],
communitarianism might turn out to be the political aspect of [virtue ethics].
This whole issue concerning [virtue ethics] and political theory, however, has
only just started to be explored.")
12. Helpful collections of recent work on virtue ethics include: VIRTUE
ETHICS (Stephen L. Darwall ed. 2003); VIRTUE ETHICS (Roger Crisp & Michael
Slote eds., 1997); How SHOULD ONE LIVE? ESSAYS ON THE VIRTUES (Roger Crisp
ed., 1996); VIRTUE ETHICS: A CRITICAL READER (Daniel Statman ed., 1997).
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III
What is communitarian virtue ethics? What would it
mean to allow or encourage this sort of conversation to play
a larger and more important role in our legal discourse? It
would not mean adding new or strange considerations to
legal debates. Nor would it mean asking people to think or
argue in refined or abstract ways about legal issues-by, for
example "applying" virtue ethics to law. Instead, it would
simply mean making space in public and legal argumenta-
tion for the sorts of considerations which I suggest already
and appropriately, if implicitly, inform our thinking. This
way of thinking and talking about the law is particularly
necessary and appropriate in regards to high profile areas
of law that are connected in people's minds to large visions
of cultural identity. Communitarian virtue ethics would
mean, above all, enabling and encouraging participants in
the legal and political process to speak and argue about
what the law says about who we are, and what it can help
us become.
There have been at least two recent efforts by
prominent legal academics to apply virtue ethics to law. It
may be helpful to outline the central difference between my
approach and those. Kyron Huigens has suggested that
virtue ethics might provide a way of thinking about
questions of criminal responsibility. 13 It remains unclear,
however, whether virtue ethics is capable of providing the
sort of predictability and consistency arguably called for in
the context of criminal law--or whether it gets to the heart
of our reasons and justifications for affixing criminal
responsibility. Heidi Feldman has suggested that virtue
ethics provides a way of thinking about the negligence
standard and the role of the jury in tort cases. 14 Her effort
is, I think, more successful. As both a descriptive and
normative matter, it is helpful to see tort juries as asking
and answering questions not just about conduct but about
the sort of character-reasonable, prudent, careful-
revealed by that conduct. However, both Huigens' and
13. See generally Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Criminal Negligence, 1 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 431 (1998). See also Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1425 (1995).
14. Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics
and Tort Law, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1431 (2000).
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Feldman's use of virtue ethics differ fundamentally from my
own. The fundamental difference is that in my view, virtue
ethics is better suited to introspection than judgment-
more useful in guiding one's own behavior than in
evaluating that of others, since evaluations of others is
essentially instrumental to the construction of one's own
character and identity. For that reason, I suggest that
whatever part virtue ethics might play in judging others, its
best and essential function ought to be to help us think
about ourselves.
In what legal or political contexts would CVE be most
applicable? What sorts of arguments would it allow or
encourage? As a rule, CVE would be most useful in high
profile areas of law, where rules and institutions and
practices are most closely intertwined with cultural and
historical community identity. Concrete examples will give
some sense of the context, range, and potential applicability
of this approach. These examples are framed at what might
seem like a preposterous level of generality. Mea culpa. I
fully recognize the difficulty of speaking generally about a
theory whose central mandate is a form of specificity; and I
have elsewhere elaborated several more concrete examples
at some length, some of which I will return to below.15 Here,
however, my aim is to construct or describe a theoretical
framework-communitarian virtue ethics-for that and
further elaboration. To that end, breadth is at the outset
more important than specificity.
Begin with the First Amendment. It seems safe to say
that American law places a higher value on free speech
than does the law of most other nations around the world.
Why so? One answer may be that we simply weigh the costs
15. See generally Sherman J. Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the
Confrontation Clause, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1258 (2003) [hereinafter Clark,
Confrontation Clause] (arguing that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment may best be understood as calling for a particular form of
responsibility and courage in the prosecution of criminal defendants); Sherman
J. Clark, The Character of Direct Democracy, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 341
(2004) [hereinafter Clark, Direct Democracy] (arguing that the initiative, rather
than providing an education in citizenship, may entrench a public character of
selfishness and irresponsibility); Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our
Convictions, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2381 (1999) [herinafter Clark, Convictions]
(arguing that the criminal trial jury embodies and demands a similar form of
responsibility-taking in the act of judgment).
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and benefits of free expression differently than do other
communities. But that is only part of the story, and indeed
begs the question of why. Another response would be the
obvious one-that protection of free expression is mandated
by our Constitution. Again, however, the question is why
that is the case, and why have we interpreted that mandate
as we have? The answer, certainly, lies not just in the way
we balance costs and benefits, and not just in the text of our
founding documents, but in our history, our culture, our
sense of who we are as a people.
One way to acknowledge this reality would be to say
that the First Amendment plays an important symbolic role
in American life. I hesitate to embrace this description only
because the term "symbolic" seems inevitably to imply or
invite the addition of the term "merely," as if what really
matters about the First Amendment, and law generally, is
its pragmatic consequences and/or its fidelity to some set of
normative principles, here constitutional principles-next
to which concerns about the role played by free speech in
the American self-conception are somehow illegitimate or
trivial-"merely symbolic." This perspective recalls those
who would say that marriage is "just a piece of paper."
Indeed it is. It is a "piece of paper"-a symbol, if you will-
with history and meaning, and which plays an important
role in the way many people understand themselves and
their lives.
Or consider guns. If there is an area where American
law and culture is more out of line with the rest of the world
than in its extreme protection of free speech, it is in our
protection of gun ownership by individuals. Why is that?
And why are debates over gun control so contentious?
Again, it begs the question to point to the text of the Second
Amendment, or to say that we, or many of us, "value" gun
ownership more highly than do other communities. What
drives support for gun rights is not just an ambiguous
constitutional provision, and not just, if at all, an
evaluation of the relative costs and benefits. As in the case
of free expression, it is instead a sense of the role this issue
plays in many people's conception of community. The right
to own a gun is for many inexorably connected to a deep if
vaguely defined vision of cultural identity-a vision which
includes things such as fathers and sons hunting together
in the fall, a history and self-conception of self-reliance, and
a sense of personal freedom.
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Now, it is certainly possible to argue that this vision is
misinformed, or even silly-that guns should not play such
a large role in anyone's self-conception or sense of
community, or that such considerations should be given
little weight in an arena where real and severe and
measurable consequences for public safety hang in the
balance. I suggest, and will argue below, that it is not at all
silly-that it makes perfect sense for people to care as much
about who they are as about how safe they are. The
preliminary point, however, is simply that we may not be
able to understand the intransigence of resistance to gun
control without recognizing the way in which guns and
their regulation are seen by many as saying something
important if not well-defined about themselves and their
lives. This much at least should be evident to anyone who
has talked with gun owners, and has in fact been
empirically demonstrated. 16 CVE provides a framework for
thinking and talking about those concerns.
Environmental regulation is another context which
seems to call out for recognition of the role played by law in
the articulation of public character and identity. Why are
we so happy to learn that the bald eagle is no longer on the
brink of extinction? Why have people worked so hard and
against so much opposition to reintroduce wolves to
Yellowstone National Park? Why would it likely bother us
more to see the demise of the grizzly bear than to see the
extinction of the arroyo toad? More fundamentally, what is
the nature and source of our obligation to preserve or
protect the environment? It is possible to give either
consequentialist or deontological answers to these sorts of
questions; but it is evident that more is going on. One
reason we do not want to be responsible for the death of the
last grizzly bear is, understandably and appropriately,
because of what it would say about us. Perhaps we do not
want to evince the arrogance and hubris that would be
displayed by the unnecessary destruction of these crea-
tures. Perhaps we would prefer to see ourselves as
stewards, or somehow in unity with our natural world.
I am in no position to say what the wolf or grizzly bear
mean to us as a people, or what our relationship with
16. Dan Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A
Cultural Theory of Gun Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (2003).
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nature should be. But if those things matter to people-and
it seems safe to say they do-we need find some way, some
place, in which to talk about them. More to the point, if one
of the things that really matters to people about the
regulation and protection of the environment is what it will
say about us to treat our natural world in various ways,
then the law ought to recognize that. A central premise of
CVE, further defended below, is that we ought to make
space in our legal discourse for what matters to people,
rather than forcing people to put their real concerns aside
and argue in ways that we find easier to deal with. If the
things people care about turn out to be difficult to express,
as real things often are, we ought to help people find a
language for their expression.
IV
Why so? Why should we allow these sorts of vague and
uncertain arguments a place in our legal discourse?
Perhaps instead we should encourage or require people to
set aside these sorts of inchoate symbolic concerns and
focus instead on either fidelity to authority, variously
understood, or on the real and measurable consequences of
law. Begin with lawyers-the folks who do much of the
arguing. Why should we learn to talk about character with
the same skill and energy as we talk about consequences
and principles?
The first reason lawyers should learn to make these
sorts of arguments is straightforward, and is implicit in
what has already been said. Lawyers need to persuade; and
persuasion requires speaking to those things that matter to
people. I have made this point elsewhere, 17 and will not
belabor it here, but the key to persuasion is not to make the
best or most clever arguments in the abstract. Instead,
what persuades-what actually reaches people-is the
ability to make or find space in their worldview for the
outcomes or understandings one would advocate. This
means responding not solely or even primarily to the
explicit arguments people make, which will be limited and
17. See generally Sherman J. Clark, The Character of Persuasion, 1 AVE
MARIA L. REV. 61 (2003) [hereinafter The Character of Persuasion]; Sherman J.
Clark, Literate Lawyering: An Essay on Imagination and Persuasion, 30
RUTGERS L.J. 575 (1999).
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constrained by what they have been taught is acceptable
and appropriate in a given context, but also responding to
the often unspoken concerns and meanings that animate
and give rise to their opinions and judgments. So, if
people-judges, jurors, fellow legislators, voters-care as
much about what a law says about them as what it does for
them, lawyers need to find ways of speaking to that.
Guns again provide perhaps the clearest example,
though far from the only one. This is the central point of
Kahan and Braman's excellent recent article.18 Though I
neither embrace nor share their approach in every
particular, their work supports my essential claim, and will
allow me to clarify and distinguish my own position. In fact,
their own opening summary of their findings is worth
quoting at some length:
[W] e demonstrate that individuals' positions on gun control derive
from their cultural worldviews: individuals of an egalitarian or
solidaristic orientation tend to support gun control; those of a
hierarchical or individualist orientation to oppose it .... The role
of culture in determining attitudes toward guns suggests that
empirical analyses of the effect of gun control on violent crime are
unlikely to have much impact . . . . Rather than focusing on
quantifying the impact of gun control laws on crime, then,
academics and others who want to contribute to resolving the gun
debate should dedicate themselves to constructing a new
expressive idiom that will allow citizens to debate the cultural
issues that divide them in an open and constructive way. 19
The essential point is straightforward. In this arena at
least, people seem to care more about meaning and identity,
albeit not often clearly or explicitly articulated, than they
do about risks and consequences, however well or
thoroughly documented. If, therefore, lawyers and politi-
cians hope to be persuasive in this context, they will need to
find ways of talking about or at least dealing with meaning
and identity. If it is true that people's views are deeply
connected to their sense of self and community, advocates
on either side can argue until they are blue in the face
about the practical consequences or risks of guns and gun
18. See Kahan & Braman, supra note 16.
19. Id. at 1291-92.
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control without so much as a hope of actually reaching
anyone or changing anyone's view.
It is worth noting, however, the primary way in which
Kahan and Braman's approach differs from that which I
advocate under the heading of communitarian virtue ethics.
One of the aims of the genus of cultural theory in which
they are working is to categorize, measure, and attempt to
predict how people of various cultural stripes will evaluate
certain sorts of risks. To that end, it is necessary to make
use of broad typologies-dividing people's worldviews into
"egalitarian or solidaristic" as opposed to "hierarchical or
individualistic," for example. Those categories-their
viability, their definition, the coding of people into one
category or another, etc.-are the source of much debate
among cultural theorists and their critics. But those
debates need not detain us here, because the project of CVE
differs from that of empirical cultural theory in the same
way the lawyer's goal differs from that of the social
scientist.
The lawyer is most often faced with a particular person
or set of people who need to be reached or persuaded,
whether it be a judge, a jury, or fellow members of the
legislature. The aim is to hear and understand those par-
ticular people as well as possible, which requires above all
that one see the issue and the world as the other sees it.
This is a profoundly difficult and human skill-rooted in
experience, empathy, reading, openness, intelligence, and a
willingness to enter into the particular worldviews of
others. In this effort, it is neither necessary nor necessarily
helpful to perform a categorical two-step-first coding the
person one would persuade as this cultural type or the
other, then employing the arguments appropriate to that
type.
It is remarkable-a testament to the power of meaning
over consequences-that even at the low resolution
provided by broad cultural categories, empirical research
can say something about what sorts of arguments will
persuade particular people. And lawyers should take to
heart the suggestions made thereby about what sorts of
arguments to employ in various contexts. But a thoughtful
lawyer needs to talk to a particular people. That means not
necessarily categorizing them, but rather looking them in
the eye, hearing them, understanding what really moves
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and concerns them-even if they themselves are often
unable to articulate those concerns well or at all.
When we do this, when we make a real effort to enter
into the worldviews of others, what we are likely to find is
that what Kahan and Braman have demonstrated
empirically in the context of guns is almost certainly true
for a broad range of issues. Talk with people about freedom
of speech, or environmental protection. Talk with them
about affirmative action, or abortion, or gay rights, or high
profile criminal trials, or constitutional rights. What drives
and animates people's views is not just their evaluation of
the practical costs and benefits, and not just their abstract
moral principles. What matters to them as much will be a
complicated and messy and difficult to navigate confluence
of meaning, culture, and identity.
From there, the choice is ours. Do we want to argue
about the things we think ought to matter to people,
consoling ourselves as best we can by saying that those we
inevitably fail to persuade are being irrational or
intransigent? Or, do we want to reach people? If so, we may
need on occasion to lay aside the comforting water-tightness
of our empirical demonstrations and the appealing order of
our normative systems. We may need to find a way to talk
to people about what the law means to them.
V
Granted that lawyers in an effort to persuade might
want to learn how to appeal to various visions of individual
or public character, why should the law or legal institutions
allow us to do that? Why not preclude or discourage such
arguments as out of bounds or irrelevant?
The first reason legal processes should be open to
arguments about community character and identity
parallels the reason lawyers should learn to make those
arguments. Arguably, in a democratic society, law and
government ought to respond to what people care about. If
what they care about, what they want to try to construct or
articulate through their law, is who they are, then we ought
to make our processes open to those concerns.
But that argument is insufficient. First of all, it
implicitly presumes that people's concerns are exogenous-
that law simply responds to what people care about. In fact,
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law helps construct as well as respond to peoples
perspectives and concerns. Which means that it is an
evasion to say that the law should be fully open to certain
kinds of arguments simply because those are the sorts of
arguments people want to make. If character-based
arguments were harmful, irrelevant, or destructive of
democratic institutions, we might want to discourage them
even if they would reflect people's current desires or
opinions. If, on the other hand, we believe that character-
based arguments and concerns ought to be a part of legal
and political discourse, we should perhaps encourage and
facilitate them even if the constraints so far implicitly
placed on public argumentation have produced a situation
in which people do not (yet) realize that character is what
they really want to talk about.
So there is no ducking the question. Should we
encourage these sorts of arguments? Here, I will to put on
the table the assumption at the heart of virtue ethics-the
assumption on which the normative force, although not the
descriptive force, of the theory of communitarian virtue
ethics turns. The assumption is this: human happiness
depends as much on what kind of person you are as on
whether what you get what you want, or whether your life
is lived consistently with some set of first principles. To
some, this assumption will be so obviously true as to
require no evidence. For others, no proof will suffice. For
purposes of this essay, it will go essentially undefended-a
contingent assumption, as it were. If you accept it, what
follows? But undefended need not mean undescribed. We
can at least clarify the role played by one's view of what
constitutes happiness in thinking about the appropriate
place for character-based argumentation in law and politics.
The starting point for CVE would be this: the central
aim of law and politics ought to be the happiness of the
people governed thereby. By happiness, I mean not just
short-term pleasure or enjoyment, but rather lasting,
satisfying, meaningful, praise-worthy fulfillment in their
lives. I mean flourishing, living well-what the Greeks
called eudaimonia. This idea-this rich view of happiness-
is of course not self-defining. In some sense, in fact, the
term is a place-holder for all of the things we believe make
for a rich and admirable life. It is, in the straightforward
sense meant by Aristotle, the name we have given to the
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human flourishing which we admire, and to which we
aspire-to the lives we would emulate.
Describing our goal as happiness, thus broadly defined,
is not mere question-begging. Although we cannot pin it
down with precision, we have some sense of it's components,
and at least a decent intuition as to what it might be like-
an intuition which investigation and thought can further
inform. Virtue ethics, like life, is best practiced by those
who, following Aristotle, refuse either to sahctify or ignore
the common sense and intuition built over time through
experience. And even given our highly general definition of
happiness, we can certainly say some things about what it
is not. It is not the satiation of a glutton, or the grinning
contentment of an idiot. We neither admire these men nor
aspire to their condition. Roughly speaking, happiness is
the moral, spiritual, intellectual equivalent of good health.
It is the kind of thing you mean when you wish a young
couple happiness in their marriage. And our inability at the
outset to reduce it beyond that to a single component, or to
define it with precision, should not prevent us from
pursuing it. By seeking happiness without having nailed it
down, we are not begging the question; we are asking it.
The question is whether we can craft or find ways of
being which will give us the praiseworthy, enduring
happiness we desire. This is what we ought to try and make
possible for our citizens. This is what our philosophy and
political theory ought to try and define and articulate. It is
what our scholarship ought to try and help us achieve
through our law and politics. But our legal scholarship does
not do that. Instead, legal scholarship mirrors moral theory.
There are normative strains, which focus on legal or
political first principles, including democratic legitimacy
and individual rights. And, predominantly, there are
utilitarian approaches, which seek to weigh costs and
benefits in various ways. Neither of these is wrong, indeed
both are necessary. But even taken together, they are
incomplete. The braid is missing a crucial strand.
The near absence of this strand is due, I think, to the
pervasive influence of one overriding, intuitively appealing,
but ultimately untenable assumption. The assumption is
that making people marginally richer, healthier, or safer-
in short, giving them more of what they want-will make
them happier. Unfortunately, there is little or no evidence
supporting this assumption. On the contrary, if there is one
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lesson to be learned from millennia of philosophic and
religious thought, and decades of social science, it is this:
more stuff will not make you more happy. There is no need
to take the extreme or perverse position that material well-
being or preference satisfaction are irrelevant to happiness.
I will grant, with Aristotle, that it is hard to be happy if you
are in desperate poverty or in constant pain. So, all things
being equal, we should pursue policies that conduce to
wealth and health, and in particular, those policies which
address the needs of those worse off among us. But no one
has ever made a convincing argument that the way to make
a community happier as a whole is to figure out how to
make its already-fairly-well-off citizens a little more so.
This makes it reasonable to entertain and consider the
implications of the alternative hypothesis-albeit tentative
and unprovable-with both a long pedigree and a certain
amount of intuitive appeal. Perhaps what makes a person
happy is not being a little richer or fitter or safer. Instead,
what makes for lasting happiness is being the right kind of
person. At this point, I need not and probably should not
specify a view as to what kind of person one ought to be in
order to be happy in these ways. My initial claim does not
depend on one accepting a particular view of what sort of
character will conduce to or constitute happiness, although
that is certainly a central question raised by this approach.
The assumption is simply that what matters is not just
whether we get what we want, and not just whether we do
what is right, but also what kind of people we are.
This point is crucial, and bears emphasis. It is arguably
not possible to avoid making some sort of untested and
perhaps untestable assumptions about human happiness.
Current legal and policy thinking certainly does. In
particular, the entire edifice of law and economics depends
upon the underlying assumption that satisfying prefer-
ences, or making people marginally richer, safer, etc., will
make them happier-will lead to well-being. I am being
intentionally vague here about the assumption or
assumptions underlying law and economics, because there
are an infinite number of ways it or they might be specified.
But some such assumption is inarguably at work. Put
differently, either law and economics depends upon some
version of that assumption, or it is an utter waste of time.
We do not have an army of legal academics trying to figure
out how to make people marginally lighter in complexion.
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We do not have an army of legal academics trying to figure
out how to make people marginally better at playing video
games. Why not? Because it would be silly and pointless.
And it would be silly and pointless because there is no
underlying assumption that making people lighter in
complexion or better at video games will conduce to their
well-being in any meaningful way. So, if it is objected that
the crucial assumption of virtue ethics-that character is
the route to well-being-is unproven, consider the
alternative. It is at least as plausible, indeed vastly more
so, if human experience, philosophy, religion, and social
science are any guide, than is the contrary assumption on
which we seem so heavily now to rely. At the very least,
character is worth considering and pursuing alongside the
consequentialist aims for which we now so vigorously strive,
and over which so much academic ink is spilled.
If so, if character is as likely an avenue to well-being as
are consequences and principles, and if a central aim of law
and politics is or ought to be the well-being of the people
governed thereby, then perhaps law ought to make room for
a conversation about public character, just as it makes
room for talk of measurable consequences and normative
principles.
VI
But why should law play this role? Even if one accepts
the claim that these things are worth talking about-that
character matters-is law the right arena for its
development and articulation? Given how much is at stake
in the high profile contexts in which this approach would be
most applicable-real and measurable consequences for
public health, safety, and prosperity, for example-perhaps
we should find other ways and places to talk about who we
want to be, rather than allow these symbolic or expressive
concerns to pervade our legal and policy decision-making.
First of all, it bears repeating that it is a mistake to assume
that character is less essential-less "real"-than health or
safety or prosperity. However, it is still worth asking
whether there are other vehicles for the construction of
character which might relieve law of the need to play this
role.
Certainly, law is not the only avenue through which we
might construct and articulate public identity and
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character. There is art, including film and television. There
is also public ceremony-occasions of pure and sometimes
powerful symbolic importance, such as presidential
inaugurations and Fourth of July parades. However,
depending on one's account of character formation, law may
be a more essential vehicle than is at first evident-perhaps
even an indispensable one.
On Aristotle's account, for example, character is formed
essentially through conduct. 20 If you want to be brave, the
main thing you need to do is not so much study the virtue of
courage, in an effort to "figure out" how to be courageous. 2 1
You need to do some of that, of course; but the main thing
you need to do is to find occasions on which to be brave. 22 It
may help to tell yourself that you are brave, but that alone
will not suffice, if Aristotle has it right. Courage is built
through the doing of courageous acts. Start small, if
necessary-by facing the neighbor's dog who has you
frightened, or by testing yourself against whatever it is that
gives you fear. Fake it, at first, if necessary-hide or work
through your fear-but do it, regularly and intentionally.
Eventually, it will get good to you; and eventually become
part of who you are. Character and action are on this
account in this way an interconnected cycle, tied together
by aspiration.
If this Arsitotelean account of character formation is at
all correct-and it seems safe to say it is, at least to some
extent-what are the implications for the development of
community, as opposed to individual, character and
identity? The upshot is that we need to find places where
we act as a community, and through those actions both
demonstrate and develop the public virtues to which we
aspire. It is possible to imagine public hortatory proclama-
tions, perhaps by legislatures, about what sort of people we
are or want to be-"We hereby formally and solemnly
announce that we are a kind and courageous people." But
imagine how such a proclamation would be greeted-how
little meaning it would have. If we want to be kind, or if we
want to be brave, we have to find places to act in those
20. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra
note 1, at bk. I, 1103a30-35.
21. See id. at bk. III, 1115a7-1118a19 (further discussion of courage).
22. See id.
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ways. We also have to be willing to talk and argue about
what those virtues mean, what counts as kindness or
courage; but mainly we need to find occasions on which to
be those things, and to do so as a political community.
And law is one of the few places we act as a community.
It is not the only one. There is foreign policy, including war
and international relief, although those should perhaps be
seen as aspects of law. There are also high profile political
processes, including elections and plebiscites; and those too
should be seen as occasions for the construction of public
character. But law is the primary place where we act not as
individuals or as groups within the community, but as or on
behalf of the political and legal community itself.
It is worth emphasizing here that CVE does not,
however, assume a unified or coherent shared cultural
identity. My liberal use of the ambiguous first person plural
may give rise to a misunderstanding on this point. I have
spoken freely about what "we" want to be as a people, or
what matters to "us" as a community. Is it my claim,
therefore, that there is out there somewhere some unified
and potentially identifiable sense of American character or
identity that the law can and ought to articulate? No. Nor
do I maintain that all political communities must be in
some way meaningful at all-that every political commu-
nity even has a significant character.
On this particular point, my core claim is much more
modest, and can if necessary be reduced to two propositions.
First, being a member of a given community-being an
American, for example-can play a role in at least some
people's self-conception. It means something to at least
some people to say that they are a member of that
community. Second, a community's high profile legal rules
and institutions can play a role in determining what it
means. Will those meanings be contested? Absolutely, and
all the more so in a large, diverse, and heterogeneous
community. Legal institutions can and do play an
important role in the formation and articulation of public
character primarily because the question of who "we" are is
perpetually in dispute, and, again, because there are so few
other places where we might be said to speak or act as a
community.
It bears noting as well that virtues need not be defined
with scientific or philosophical precision in order for them
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to be developed and articulated through public action. As
with a flag in the distance, it is quite possible to aim at
something, even to rally around it, without necessarily
being able to see it clearly. We want to be brave, for
example, or kind, or wise; and these are likely to be things
worth pursuing even though we will never be able to nail
them down. A social scientist might reasonably demand
precise definitions before attempting to study or quantify
the effects of a particular trait. An academic philosopher
might reasonably demand that the concept be clarified
before it is analyzed. Perhaps that is why social science and
academic philosophy have so little to tell us about courage
or kindness or wisdom. The law, however, serves not
primarily as a vehicle through which we analyze or trace
the consequences of clearly-defined notions of courage,
kindness, or wisdom, but rather as an arena in which we
work through what it means to be brave, kind, or wise.
It may be objected that it is somehow disingenuous for
a community to try and enact virtues that it does not really
and fully possess. Here, the critical distinction is between
hypocrisy and aspiration. This is why action, rather then
hortatory pronouncement, is essential. For a community to
try and describe itself as brave or kind without making any
effort to emulate those traits would indeed be disingenuous
and hypocritical. But it is not hypocrisy to try and be better
than we are-to try and find occasions on which to embody
the things we aspire to be, despite the fact that we often
and elsewhere fall short. That is not hypocrisy; it is hope.
VII
To what extent should the sorts of arguments suggested
by communitarian virtue ethics be considered legal
arguments? Put more concretely, how much weight should
courts give to these sorts of arguments in deciding cases or
interpreting specific legal rules? The answer, I think, is
that courts should give the same sort of weight they give to
arguments based on normative or utilitarian concerns. In
any legal argument, the aim in part is to give sensible effect
to relevant authority. Where a statute is intended to
achieve specific consequentialist goals, parties talk about
whether a proposed interpretation would or would not
further those ends. Where a constitutional provision is
intended to vindicate or protect a particular right or
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principle, parties talk about those rights or principles.
Where a common law rule has evolved to accomplish certain
ends or vindicate certain principles, courts think about
those ends and concerns in deciding how the rule should be
applied or further developed. Similarly, where a rule has
arguably been enacted or has evolved in an effort to say
something about the character or identity of the political
community, that too is a legitimate subject of legal
argument.
Of course, that does not answer the question of how
much weight any particular argument ought to get in any
given situation. But nor is it possible to make a blanket
statement about the appropriate force or applicability of
consequentialist or deontological arguments. Competing
legal theories make more or less space for various sorts of
concerns. And different kinds of arguments are obviously
more or less persuasive in different situations. One of the
things lawyers ought to be able to argue about is the force
which ought to be given to particular concerns in particular
situations.
This is or ought to be nothing new. Consider a recent
high profile Supreme Court case, for example. In Crawford
v. Washington23 the issue was the appropriate interpreta-
tion of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
What does or should it mean to require that criminal
defendants be "confronted with the witnesses against
them?" In particular, under what circumstances should it
be considered a violation of a defendant's confrontation
rights when a statement made out of court is used against
him at trial without an opportunity for cross-examination?
Prior to Crawford, that determination turned essentially on
the reliability of the statement, albeit approached obliquely
and awkwardly through the lens of hearsay law. In
Crawford, the court decided that if an out of court
statement is "testimonial" in nature, use of the statement
against a criminal defendant at trial without the opportu-
nity for cross-examination constitutes a Confrontation
Clause violation even if the statement is deemed highly
reliable.
In the debates surrounding Crawford, parties and amici
and advocates made a range of arguments. As would be
23. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
[Vol. 53778
VIRTUE ETHICS
expected, both sides made arguments about the
consequences of adopting one interpretation or another.
And, of course, they argued about what interpretation
would be most consistent with the text of the Sixth
Amendment as elucidated in precedent and the principles
and ends it is thought to serve. As did I. In an article
published prior to the decision in Crawford, I argued that
the Confrontation clause ought to be understood as
embodying a certain character trait which animated the
evolution of the right, which the Framers found compelling,
and which arguably has continued to play an important role
in the American self-conception. 24 That trait is a form of
courage-a willingness to look in the eye of those one would
accuse; and a concomitant unwillingess to engage in or abet
what we consider the cowardly act of anonymous or hidden
accusation. Looking at the history of the confrontation
right, both prior to and since the adoption of the Sixth
Amendment, I suggested that it has always served the
important symbolic function of helping to construct and
articulate that aspect of public character and identity. If so,
the reliability of a statement should not be central to the
inquiry into its admissibility under the Confrontation
Clause.
However persuasive or non-persuasive one finds that
particular argument in that particular context, the point
here is simply that there is no need to see it as fundamen-
tally different from-or somehow less "legal" than- the
sorts of arguments that are made in cases every day. In
interpreting our Constitution, our statutes, and our
common law, we argue about the ends our rules and
institutions were enacted to serve, have evolved to serve, or
might serve if variously interpreted and applied. This is the
bread and butter of the lawyer's work. So, if those ends
arguably include the articulation of public character, then
arguments about public character are as much "legal
arguments'-and as much entitled to be given weight in
legal decision-making-as are any other.
24. See generally Clark, Confrontation Clause, supra note 15; Clark, Direct
Democracy, supra note 15; Clark, Convictions, supra note 15.
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VIII
How do arguments about character fit with other sorts
of arguments? CVE does not require or suggest that a
conversation about character should supplant thinking
about either moral principles or the consequences of our
conduct. These things are inherently and inevitably
interconnected in both individual and public discourse.
Character, consequences, and principles are each crucial
and necessary ways of talking about and understanding the
others. We evaluate our conduct in light of how we
understand ourselves. We develop our principles in part
with an eye to consequences. We understand ourselves in
part both through what we accomplish and through what
we stand for. It is, I have said, like a braid; and falls apart
without all three strands. If, however, the metaphor is
insufficiently precise, I might offer several alternative ways
to specify the relationship between these three
interconnected strands.
First, it is possible to take the position that character is
primary and self-sufficient as an end. On that view, what
matters most, and for its own sake, is being the right kind
of person. Whether you are "happy" would on this view be
beside the point. What you do-whether you do good or
harm, whether your actions comply with some set of
principles-would be relevant only insofar as that conduct
is constitutive or revelatory of your character. This view,
although perhaps a plausible reading of some classical
virtue ethics, is too strong. It gives insufficient weight to
consequentialist and normative concerns, and invites
selfishness and egoism.
An alternative will appeal to those most firmly wedded
to a consequentialist perspective. On this view, character is
instrumental to conduct. Assume for a moment that what
we care about is getting people to behave in certain ways-
presumably ways which are cooperative, productive,
efficient, etc. One way to get people to behave is not merely
to give them the right incentives, and not merely to teach
them that certain conduct is right or wrong. On Aristotle's
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account, the best way to foster good behavior is to teach
people to be the sort of people who behave well.25
Despite the appeal of this claim, for two reasons I do
not rely on the power of character to shape conduct as an
essential defense of or element in communitarian virtue
ethics. First, the underlying assumption is less certain than
it might appear. At some level and under some
circumstances, it is certainly right. One reason you do not
steal is not just because you fear the consequences of being
caught and punished, and not just because you believe
stealing to be morally wrong-though both of those
probably play some role. To at least some extent, the reason
you do not steal is that you do not want to be a thief. The
character-based judgment, moreover, does not merely beg
the question. It frames it for you. It makes it unnecessary
for you every day to remind yourself that it would be
dangerous and wrong to take your friend's wallet.
However, a mounting body of social scientific evidence
suggests that behavior is primarily determined or well
predicted by stable character traits or dispositions. This
body of work has been summarized and deployed under the
heading of "situational character" in recent work by Hanson
and Yosifin. 26 Their basic claim is that human conduct (as
well as attitudes) is much more responsive to, and thus
manipulable through, circumstances than we are inclined to
recognize or acknowledge. 27 It is worth noting, however,
that the real victims of Hanson and Yosifin's critique are
not character-based theories of human conduct, but rather
the numerous versions of the rational actor model which so
pervade our legal and political thinking. Put differently, the
social science critique of the dispositionist position leaves
much more room to believe that people act in response to
self-perception and identity, including a sense of
community-based expectations, than to the regnant if
25. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIc WORKS OF ARISTOTLE,
supra note 1, at bk. I, 1102a8-10 ("[tihe true student of politics ... is thought to
have studied virtue above all things: for he wishes to make his fellow citizens
good and obedient to the laws.").
26. See generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifin, The Situational Character.- A
Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1 (2004).
27. See id.
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implicit assumption that people respond to their evaluation
of perceived costs and benefits.
My second and more central reason for not relying on
the ability of character to shape conduct in my defense of a
character-based approach to law is that to do so would put
the cart before the horse. If it is true that what conduces to
happiness is being a certain kind of person, rather than
getting certain stuff or doing certain things, then what
matters about conduct is its ability to shape and inform
character, rather than the other way around. I do not want
to put character to work in the service of the state. I want
to put the state to work facilitating the development of
character, and thus human flourishing.
However, in the event that many will not yet be ready
to embrace the claim or assumption that character is
central to real well-being, I might also offer a weaker but
still sufficient way to understand the interrelationship
between virtue ethics, consequentialist thinking, and moral
first principles. It is to see a character-based conversation
as simply providing an excellent and useful framework for
thinking about the latter two sorts of concerns. Even if you
are convinced that what really matters is either the moral
status of one's conduct or the consequences of one's conduct,
we need to find ways of encouraging people to think well
and fully about those things. Virtue ethics does that.
Thinking and talking about what sort of people we want to
be is, at the very least, a natural and productive way of
thinking and talking about both what we think is right and
what we want to accomplish.
To reemphasize, my own claim, and that of the virtue
ethics out of which my approach grows, is stronger.
Character, on this view, is not just a way of talking about
consequences or principles, it is an indispensable part of a
how a thoughtful person thinks about life, without which
talk of consequences and principles comes unraveled. It is,
if the assumptions underlying virtue ethics are correct, the
best route to real human thriving. I highlight the possibility
of a weaker but still sufficient function simply to suggest
that this perspective need not be fully embraced in order to
see the value of at least allowing a conversation about
character to play a role in public discourse.
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What follows? Start with the practice of law, as engaged
in daily by lawyers, judges, legislatures, and administra-
tors. Granted that through the law we ought to be willing to
think and talk about character, how should the law make
space for that? The specific relationship between any given
rule or practice or institution and public character or
identity will of course depend entirely on the circumstances,
and therefore so will the scope of appropriate or applicable
argument. At a general level, however, the main
implications of CVE for law are twofold, and
straightforward.
First, we should be aware of ways in which we may
already be instilling traits of character. There are
attributes-selfishness, for example, or greed-that we
would likely all prefer not to encourage. But we may be
doing just that, albeit unintentionally, if we are inattentive
to the impact of law and politics on public character.
Significantly, this can happen as much through our argu-
ments as through our enactments. By repeatedly and
incautiously appealing to self-interest, for example, we are
not simply responding to selfishness in society, we are
arguably helping to construct and entrench that same
trait.28 We should be cognizant of that possibility, and take
responsibility for what it is we teach, as well as what it is
we do.
Second, and more essentially, law and politics can and
do provide for a definition and description of public
character and aspiration. This is the function at the heart
of CVE. Law serves the community not just by providing
the conditions for material thriving-food, shelter, safety,
and the like-but as well by acting as the vehicle through
which people construct and articulate the traits of
character-the virtues-to which they can then aspire. On
this score, what lawyers need to do is to learn to talk and
argue well and responsibly about character. What judges
and legislatures need to do is to be willing to listen-to
recognize that these sorts of arguments may on many
circumstances be as important, as legitimate, and as "legal"
28. The Character of Persuasion, supra note 17, at 75-76.
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as the consequentialist and normative arguments they now
hear every day.
And what follows for legal scholarship? One reason law
and economics has produced and will continue to produce
such a mountain of scholarship is because it poses a
virtually limitless number of clearly identified and well-
framed problems-problems that promise to yield to the
force of analysis and produce satisfying if always tentative
answers. The problems posed by communitarian virtue
ethics are less clearly framed, and less likely to lead to clear
answers; but they are no less numerous or important.
First and foremost, legal scholars ought to think about
the connection between law and public character. If legal
decision-making ought to be informed by an awareness of
the consequences of legal rules and institutions for public
character, legal scholarship ought to strive to highlight
those potential consequences. For example, I have made an
argument of this sort in the context of direct democracy. It
has been suggested that the initiative, by providing a rare
opportunity for political participation, serves a function of
civic education, akin to the jury, or military service. 29 I
argued that because of the way in which initiative voting is
carried out, and because of the way in which it isolates
issues and voters, it may instead entrench a public
character of selfishness and irresponsibility. 30 Initiative
voting is not at all like jury service or military service, each
of which requires both work and confrontation, and thus
may teach responsibility and courage. Voting on ballot
issues allows one to express desires without confronting
consequences, and thus arguably conduces not to
"maturation," as has been suggested, but to the opposite. It
is the infant, not the mature citizen, who knows how to say
"I want" but little or nothing else, and is encouraged to do
so as loudly as possible but with no requirement that he or
she confront or acknowledge the consequences or implica-
tions of those preferences.
Again, my point in citing my own past argument here is
not to hold myself out as some sort of exemplar. Like the
first models in a new car line, the first arguments in a new
29. See, e.g., Alan Hirsch, Direct Democracy and Civic Maturation, 29
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 209-17 (2002).
30. See generally Clark, Direct Democracy, supra note 15.
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line of thought are likely to be creaky and full of bugs that
need to be worked out over time. So, try not to judge the
potential power of the theory by my early efforts to put it to
work. I refer to those merely to give an illustration of the
sorts of things scholars ought to be willing to think about,
in confidence that my colleagues, when they do so, will be
better at it than I.
Second, legal academics ought to call upon our
colleagues in the social sciences to turn their attention to,
and help us think about, the particular ways in which law
plays a role in the construction and articulation of
community identity. Environmental law scholars for
example, should continue to inquire into the social meaning
of both environmental regulation and our relationship with
nature. In fact, environmental law scholarship has been
relatively receptive to the work on the relationship between
law and community identity, if not character per se, and
might in that sense be something of a model for other areas.
Much of this work has focused on identifiable cultural sub-
groups, particularly indigenous communities, but the
inquiry has and should continue to be broadened.31 Those
31. See Eugene Bardach & Robert A. Kagan, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE
PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 65, 114 (1982). (Studying the
impact of regulatory unreasonableness on "cultures of resistance" to
environmental laws); Charles F. Wilkinson, THE EAGLE BIRD: MAPPING A NEW
WEST 137-38 (1992) ("We need to develop an ethic of place. It is premised on a
sense of place, the recognition that our species thrives on the subtle, intangible,
but soul-deep mix of landscape, smells, sounds, history, schools, storefront,
neighbors, and friends that constitute a place, a homeland. An ethic of place
respects equally the people of a region and the land, animals, vegetation, water,
and air."); Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Working Out an Environmental Ethic:
Anniversary Lessons from Mono Lake, 4 WYO. L. REV. 1, 26 (2004) ("The first
lesson is that the pursuit of an environmental ethic, or conservation goals, often
begins with the ecology and psychology of a place. A particular place in the
natural environment-such as Mono Lake-has ecological features and
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writing about gun control should heed the advice of Kahan
and Braman and find ways of thinking about the meaning
of guns in the American self-conception. 32 Are they tied in
people's minds to character traits perceived as admirable-
traits such as self-reliance, for example, or fortitude? More
generally, legal academics ought to do what lawyers and
judges ought to do. We ought to learn to think as well and
as fully about character and identity as we now do about
principles and consequences.
These will be difficult and messy inquiries, inevitably
lacking both the comforting precision of economic analysis
and the satisfying heft of quantitative data. But if we are
searching for something, we cannot just look where the
light is best; we need to look where it really might be.
X
Finally, it may seem as though I have ducked what
ought to be the heart of the matter. What sorts of traits of
character ought the law to encourage or engender?
Alternatively put, what is the source or status of the virtues
to which a community might aspire? Are the virtues merely
conventional, varying from time to time and place to
place-manifestations of what this people or that people
happen to find admirable? If so, in what sense can CVE be a
theory with any normative force? And why not leave the
description of these sorts of cultural tastes to sociology or
anthropology? Or, are the virtues somehow eternal and
permanent, transcending culture-character traits to which
all people everywhere somehow ought to aspire? If so, what
is their source? And what is the source of the obligation
implicit in the claim that they "ought" to be pursued?
To some extent, it might not matter precisely what
virtues we pursue, or what their source is. Striving to be a
certain kind of person-focusing on character rather than
self-interest-may be valuable for its own sake, regardless
of the exact form of character emulated or pursued, at least
if the traits thereby developed are not affirmatively harmful
or dangerous. How so? Because the effort itself can provide
32. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Identity Politics and the Second Amendment
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 549 (2004).
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focus and meaning to community life. As experience
teaches, happiness is something which if pursued directly
will recede indefinitely. Rather, it must be approached
indirectly. It comes as a byproduct of being neglected, as a
consequence of a life dedicated to something else. Virtue
ethics suggests that the best candidate for that "something
else" is character. I suggest that this is as true for the polis
as for the person.
But we can say more than that. In particular, CVE does
provide a way of thinking about the origin and status of the
virtues-a way which steers clear of both relativism,
according to which the character of a community might be
seen as a matter of mere preferences or taste, and
absolutism, under which it might be necessary to take the
untenable position that all peoples everywhere should
pursue the same character traits. Instead, CVE allows us to
operate on the assumption that virtues are like other things
people build to meet their needs-houses, fences,
cathedrals, and the like. Yes, they are constructed by the
communities that make use of them; and yes, they vary
greatly from place to place and time to time. But no, they
are not completely arbitrary.
In that light, the simplest answer to the question of
what virtues ought to be pursued is that a community
ought to construct and aspire to those traits of character
that will both resonate within its own history and culture
and that will meet its current and ongoing needs. But we
can safely say slightly more than that. There are likely to
be patterns--circumstances under which communities will
predictably need or benefit from the cultivation of certain
traits. The architecture metaphor is apt. Just as people in
rainy places need good roofs, and people in cold places need
warm houses, communities faced with danger will need and
should cultivate courage. Communities faced with want
should perhaps honor thrift, or fortitude, or generosity; just
as communities faced with prosperity should perhaps guard
against greed, gluttony, and materialism. CVE would call
upon both social scientists and lawyers to be willing to
think in these terms, to be aware, as described above, of
both the intended and unintended ways in which law may
be constructing and reinforcing traits of character which
are either destructive of or valuable to the real well being of
the community.
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In the end, however, it ought to be possible to say
something more even than that-to say something more
generally about the sorts of traits worthy of emulation, and
why. This endeavor was at the heart of the classical
tradition, and in my view remains the central unanswered
question of moral and political theory. It should as well be
the question in the front of our minds as we live our lives,
both as individuals and as members of a community. Was
Plato right when he argued that character focused on love
of knowledge is the best route to real and lasting well-
being? Was Ivan Boesky right when he argued that greed is
good? What sort of people should we be? CVE cannot
answer this question-no legal theory can. What
communitarian virtue ethics does, however, is call upon us
to be willing to ask it.
